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Abstract
This paper uses a one-sector, endogenous growth model to study optimal composition
between public investment and consumption in government expenditure and its relationships with
economic growth.  Assuming a benevolent government which maximizes a representative household’s
lifetime utilities, the paper determines the unique, interior public investment share in government’s
budgets, which is determined by policy and structural parameters.  It finds that the conventional
determinants of economic growth now generate stronger growth effects, via their indirect impacts
upon optimal public spending composition.  The effects emerge from raising the marginal utility of
private consumption, relative to the marginal utility of public consumption, thereby inducing public
investment and increasing economic growth.  Our quantitative results suggest that the growth effect
is sizable.  The large growth effect via optimal public investment in our model has implications to
East Asian economic growth miracles where public investment share and economic growth are both
higher than other area’s countries.
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JEL classification:  H41, H54, O41
_________________________
￿ Correspondence address:  Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 128 Academic Rd.,
Sec.2, Taipei 11529, Taiwan.  Tel:  (886-2)27822791 ext. 309; Fax:  (886-2)27853946; Email:
bchen@econ.sinica.edu.tw.1 Another research on fiscal policy is the growth effects of taxation, made popular by Lucas (1990), including
Rebelo (1991), Turnovsky (1996), Bond et al (1996) and Mino (1996), among others.
2 Other studies have included both productive and consumptive public spending to analyze
macroeconomic adjustments; e.g., Baxter and King (1993) and Chang (1999).
3 For example, in the 1980s and early 1990s the share of public investment in government spending was above
15% in Korea and above 20% in Taiwan, and it was a little more than 5% in the U.S. and near 5% in the UK and
France.  In Brazil, it is less than 5%.  See IMF (various years) and CEPD (2001).
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I.  Introduction
Since the work by Barro (1990), growth effects of public spending have been one of the
popular topics in economics research.
1  This fashion results partly from the fact that the effects of
fiscal policy have been an important area of policy debates in macroeconomics during the 1970s and
earlier.  It is natural for the growth effects of public spending to redraw attentions.  Existing
endogenous growth models specify public expenditure either as productive or as consumptive.  While
productive public spending is formulated as an investment to externally enhance private production,
consumptive public spending is devised to externally increase households’ utility.  Recent works such
as Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Fisher and Turnovsky
(1998), and Chen (2003) have adopted the former fashion in specifying government spending, and
other studies like Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997) and Devereux and Wen (1998) have used the latter
modeling strategy.  In addition, some analyses have incorporated both productive and consumptive
aspects of public spending in their models, e.g., Barro (1990) and Turnovsky ( 2000).
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The composition between public consumption and public investment differs substantially
across countries.  Indeed, the share of public capital account in government spending is usually high
in East Asian countries, low in North American and European countries, and much lower among Latin
American countries.
3  Moreover, the set of countries with a large share of public investment in
government spending has accomplished higher growth, while the set with a small share has
experienced lower growth.  Although it is clear to see a large share of productive public expenditure4 We could think of the decision procedure as the government sets an optimal tax rate first, and given the tax
revenues, the government then determines the spending composition.  Since the optimal tax rate and taxation
policy is not the focus of this paper, we will simplify the analysis by treating the tax rate as a given parameter,
overpassing the government’s first-stage decision problem.  This first-stage problem has been studied by Barro
(1990) and Futagami, et. al. (1993), among others. 
5  Due to the difficulties for a government to obtain first-best optimization, we only study second-best
optimization   Moreover, since there is only one kind of tax rates and no debt issue in our model, the first-best
optimum cannot be replicated by a market equilibrium.  See Turnovsky (1996) for this point.
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associated positively with economic growth, the question is why some governments would choose a
large fraction of productive spending in government budgets while others choose a small share.  How
does a benevolent government determine the composition between consumptive and productive
expenditure optimally?  What are the relationships between the determinants of public spending
composition and economic growth?  These are important questions, as their answers may uncover
underlying factors enhancing long-run economic growth through a high optimal investment share in
government budgets, a mechanism that has never been disclosed by existing works.  This paper
envisages these questions in a simple, one-sector endogenous growth model. 
In this model, the government decides optimal spending composition under given income tax
rates, in order to maximize representative households’ lifetime utilities.
4  Given the optimal
composition, representative households/producers then optimize their consumption and savings
choices.  Under this setup, the government optimization is only second-best optimum.
5 Under  a
reasonable condition, we have shown the existence of unique, interior optimal composition in
government spending.  Different from existing literature, our optimal public investment share is
determined by all policy and other structural parameters.  These factors raise the marginal utility from
private consumption, relative to the marginal utility of public consumption, initiating government to
allocate fewer budgets into consumptive spending and more into productive spending at optimum, and
thereby yielding stronger positive long-run growth effects in equilibrium, than would be otherwise
obtained conventionally.  We calibrate the model into the Taiwan economy, and carry out various
shocks to the benchmark economy.  The numerical results indicate sizable economic growth effects,6 While Lee (1992) extends Barro (1990) in analyzing optimal income tax rates and public spending shares
among investment, consumption and income transfer, Lau (1995) compares the differences of  optimal public
investment share and public consumption share under growth-maximization and welfare-maximization.
Turnovsky (2000) extends Barro to consider elastic labor supply and finds many different growth effects due
to labor supply responses.  Piras (2001) studies the effect of public consumption congestion upon economic
growth and public investment share.  We should mention that Lee (1992) and Piras (2001) employ public
investment share in total government spending and are similar to ours, while the other three papers use the public
investment share in income, a concept about the size of government, and are different from ours.
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when public spending composition responds to these shocks.  
A related paper is one studied by Devarajan, et al. (1996), with two kinds of public investment
without public consumption, but its main purpose is to use data for developing countries to
empirically test the effects of government spending composition upon long-term growth.  More
related works are those with optimal public consumption and investment studied by Barro (1990), Lee
(1992), Lau (1995), Turnovsky (2000) and Piras (2001).
6  While Lee (1992) finds two kinds of optimal
composition, Barro (1990), Turnovsky (2000), Piras (2001) and Lau (1995) obtain unique optimal
composition, and the optimal investment shares in Barro, Turnovsky and Piras, determined only by
the degree of public capital externality, differ from ours.  In addition to the time-preference rate, Lau’s
(1995) optimal public investment share is determined only by the elasticity of private capital in
production, and his optimal consumption share is determined only by the private consumption share
in utility.  It is difficult to bear with the result that a parameter would increase shares for one kind of
public spending without reducing shares of remaining kinds.  Moreover, when government in these
existing studies optimizes by increasing its consumption share, it takes its investment share as given.
This paper is different from and contributes to these above papers in two important ways.
First, the optimal composition in our work is derived from general optimization in that the government
in our model trades off its spending shares, so as to satisfy the government budget constraint.
Therefore, we obtain a general form for the determinants of optimal public spending shares, a
consistent result for parameters which increase shares for one kind of public spending, must reduce
shares for remaining kinds.  Secondly, and more important, these above papers do not investigate how7 Early works modeling public capital as a factor of production function include Shell (1967) and Arrow and
Kurz (1970).  Empirically, a positive effect of public capital on private production has recently been documented
by Aschauer (1989), in a study using the U.S. data.  Lynde and Richmond (1993) find that public capital has
played an essential role in enhancing the productivity growth of U.K. manufacturing.  See Gramlich (1994) for
a survey of the empirical literature, most of which is for the U.S..  
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changes in underlying policy and economic structure affect economic growth through government’s
response to its changing investment and consumption share, entailing a growth mechanism that has
never been studied in existing literature.  This paper uncovers this channel, exhibiting steady-state
growth effects of changes in underlying policies and economic structure which are stronger than those
otherwise obtained from existing endogenous growth models.  In particular, we quantitatively evaluate
the effects of shocks upon economic growth via optimal public spending composition.  Our simulation
results not only confirm sizable growth effects, but also suggest that the induced, indirect growth
effects through public spending composition are larger than the otherwise conventional growth effects.
Our findings shed light on how the same determinants of growth lead to growth differentials between
East Asia and other parts of the world, through their impacts on optimal public spending composition.
This paper is organized as follows.  We build a one-sector, endogenous growth model in
Section II, and solve individuals’ problem in Section III.  Section IV studies optimal public spending
compositions, and Section V investigates the relationships between optimal compositions and
economic growth.  Section VI provides numerical results. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
 II.  A Basic Model
Our model differentiates productive public spending from consumptive public spending.  We
follow Barro (1990) by assigning consumptive public expenditure entering households’ instantaneous
utilities, and productive public spending entering private production in an external fashion.
7  The
economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived, representative households.  The population
does not grow, and is normalized to be a unity.  There is a continuum of representative firms, each of
which has production technology and households entitle its shares.  In addition, there is a government.5
y(t) ￿ Ak(t)￿gI(t)1￿￿, A>0, 0<￿<1, (2)





e ￿￿t [c(t)￿ gc(t)1￿￿]1￿￿￿1
1￿￿
dt, ￿ > 0, 0<￿<1, ￿￿<1￿￿< 1, (1)
A representative household is assumed to possess the following discounted lifetime utility:
in which the function c(t) is the instantaneous private consumption in t, and gc(t) is the instantaneous
public consumption.  Parameter ￿ is the instantaneous time-preference rate, ￿ is the share of private
consumption in households’ utility, relative to public consumption, and ￿ is the reciprocal of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption.  We assume 1-￿ < 1 so that the instantaneous
utility function is strictly concave in its arguments.
The production technology is externally affected by public capital services:
in which y(t) is the instantaneous output per capita, k(t) is the instantaneous capital stock per capita,
and gI(t) is the productive public service per capita in t.  Parameter 1-￿ captures the externality to
which public capital services affect private production, and A summarizes the productivity level.  A
Cobb-Douglas functional form ensures that each firm’s profit-maximization problem is concave and
well defined.  For simplification, we assume zero depreciation for capital stock.  Each firm is
competitive in the goods and input markets.
Since the government provides both public consumption and public capital services free of
charge, it is necessary to have sources of tax revenues.  We assume that public spending is financed
by income taxes.  An income tax setup generates tax revenues consistent with a perpetual growth
framework, and has been employed by Barro (1990) and many of his followers.  Denoting ￿ as the
income tax rate, then disposable income which is not spent becomes savings, and augments capital
formation in a way as follows: 6
T(t) ￿ ￿y(t) ￿ gc(t)￿gI(t) ￿ s￿y(t)￿ (1￿s)￿y(t), (3b)
￿c(t)￿(1￿￿)￿1gc(t)(1￿￿)(1￿￿) ￿ ￿(t), (4a)







where a dot notation over a variable denotes the time derivative of that variable. 
 Finally, the government budget constraint must satisfy:
which says that the government devotes a fraction s of its tax revenues T(t) to public consumption,
and the remaining fraction 1-s to public capital services.
III.  Household-Firm’s Problem 
The representative household-firm’s problem is to choose consumption flows and capital
accumulation over time, in order to maximize the discounted present value of lifetime utilities (1),
subject to production technology (2) and budget constraint (3a), given as follows:  tax rate ￿, public
consumption spending gc, and public investment gI.  Solving the problem, we define a current-value
Hamiltonian equation, to derive the following first-order conditions:
where ￿(t) is the shadow price of private capital stock in t.
Equation (4a) equates the marginal utility of current consumption to the marginal utility of
next period’s consumption, the latter of which results from this period’s savings as just the shadow
price of private capital.  Euler’s equation (4b) equates the marginal net return of private capital stock
to the marginal return on consumption, which is the time-preference rate adjusted for a capital gain.





































Assuming perfect-foresight expectations, a perfect-foresight market equilibrium, given tax
rate and public spending, is determined by household optimization (4a)-(4c), household and
government budget constraints (3a)-(3b), and production technology (2).  These equations can be used




































to solve for equilibrium, we first substitute gI = (1- s)￿y  into (2) to obtain:
Next, we substitute (5a) into gc = s￿y  and gI =(1- s)￿y, respectively, to give: 







constancy of   can be obtained from dividing (3a) by k, together with the use of (5a). c
k






The above expression characterizes the equilibrium growth rate of consumption, which, using
(3a), is equal to the equilibrium growth rate of capital and output.  We consider:8 See mathematical Appendix A for derivation.
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￿ ￿ ￿(s; ￿, A, ￿, ￿, ￿), ￿s<0, ￿￿
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< 0 if ￿ <
> ˆ ￿￿ (1/￿￿1)2
1￿(1/￿￿1)2< 1￿￿.(6c)





















While the first inequality in Condition PB guarantees a positive ￿, the second inequality assures a
bounded lifetime utility.
To characterize (6a), we totally differentiate it to obtain:
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Relationship (6b) says that economic growth is decreasing in the share of public consumption
in government spending.  In a (s, ￿) plane in Figure 1, Relationship (6b) is denoted as Locus BR (Best
Response), which is downward slopping, and intersects ￿ axis at ¯ ￿￿ 1
￿
[(1￿￿)￿(1/￿￿1)2
￿A 1/￿ ￿ ￿] >0
and s axis at     Moreover, for a given s, Locus BR shifts 0<¯ s￿ 1￿ [￿(1￿￿)￿1￿￿(1/￿￿1)2
￿￿1A ￿1/￿]￿/(1￿￿) < 1.
upward in A and ￿, and downward in ￿ and ￿, meaning that for given spending composition, steady-
state growth rates are increasing in neutral productivity, private capital share and intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and decreasing in the time-preference rate.  These properties are similar to
those in existing literature.  However, for a given s, a higher ￿ has an ambiguous effect on economic
growth.  Differentiating (6a) with respect to ￿ and ￿ gives        
Condition in (6c) says that, for a given s, a higher income tax rate increases economic growth
when it is below a threshold that is smaller than the externality of public capital.  Our threshold is
smaller that obtained in Barro (1990) and Futagami, et al. (1993), as these two works did not involve
public consumption when their government chooses tax rates to maximize the economic growth rate.
 9 The other is a growth-maximization government, which will lead to a trivial result with zero share of public
consumption.  We are not interested in this case. 
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ˆ U ￿ [U ￿ 1
(1￿￿)￿
] 1￿￿
[A 1/￿￿1/￿￿1k(0)]1￿￿ ￿ s(1￿s)(1/￿￿1)(1￿￿)c(0)￿(1￿￿)
￿￿￿(s; ￿, A, ￿, ￿, ￿) (1￿￿)
. (8b)
IV.  Optimal Government Expenditure Composition  
We now analyze the government’s second-best optimization problem.  We assume a
benevolent government whose objective is to maximize the present discounted value of a
representative household’s lifetime utility by choosing public spending composition,
9 given
production technology (2), resource constraints (3a)-(3b), and individuals’ best responses (4a)-(4c).
As individual’s best responses, along with (2) and (3a)-(3b), are summarized in (6a), the government’s
problem becomes to maximize (1) subject to (6a).  An easier way to solve this problem is to substitute
(6a) into (1) to obtain households’ indirect utility, and the problem becomes to maximize the indirect
utility.  The optimization proceeds in four steps.  First, from (6a), we attain:






Next, substituting (7a) and (7b) into (1) yields:
which can be rewritten as: 
Notice that maximization of U in (8a) with respect to s is equivalent to maximization of  in ˆ U10
dlog ˆ U
ds










￿ 0.    (9a)
￿ k
k(0)


















































































￿ 0.    (9b)
(8b) with respect to s. The optimal conditions, along with the use of (6a), yield: 
In order to derive   for (9a), we observe that (3a) must be satisfied in equilibrium, and therefore: ￿c(0)
￿s
and a differentiation of it, with the use of (6a), gives: 
Relationship (3a￿) indicates that a larger share of public consumption in government spending
reduces initial consumption via reducing initial output level (the first term in the first equality), and
increases initial consumption via reducing economic growth    As a result, the initial (￿￿
￿s
<0).
consumption  may jump downwards or upwards, in order for the equilibrium to move along the lower
BGP.  In general   for a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and therefore, ￿
￿
< ￿(1/￿￿1)(2￿1/￿)
initial consumption level would jump downwards in response to a larger share of public consumption.
Thirdly, substituting (3a￿) into (9a) yields: 
The above condition says that a larger share of public consumption in government spending

























.    (10a)
s ￿ s(￿; ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿), s￿<0, ￿￿<0, ￿￿>0, ￿￿<0, ￿￿>0, ￿￿>0,    (10b)
negative effect through reducing initial private consumption (the second term), and another indirect,
negative effect through reducing economic growth (the third term).  At optimum, the marginal gains
must equal the marginal costs.  Using (3a￿) and (6a) we derive: 
Finally, substituting (9c) into (9b) with rearrangement gives: 
Equation (10a) characterizes optimal public spending composition between consumption and
investment.   As the right-hand side in (10a) is positive, for the consistency it therefore requires ￿>s,
so that the left-hand side is positive.  Differentiating (10a) yields:
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if the second term in the large braces is positive, or if it is negative and is not too small relative to the
first term, which is the case if ￿ and ￿ are not too large.  In a (￿, s) plane in Figure 1, Relationship
(10b) is referred to as Locus OC (Optimal Composition), which is downward slopping, with a very
large slope when s is very small and with   when ￿=0.   ˆ s ￿ ￿￿(1￿￿)
￿(1￿￿)￿(1￿￿)[1￿￿￿￿￿￿(1/￿￿1)(2￿1/￿)]
<1
Characterizing Locus OC, for a given ￿, the locus shifts leftward in ￿ and ￿, and rightward in
￿, ￿ and ￿.  Intuitively, other things being equal, a higher income tax rate reduces consumption and
thus, increases the marginal utility of private consumption, and in optimum, the government reduces12
the share of public consumption in government spending, in order to raise the marginal utility of
public consumption.  Next, a larger share of private consumption directly increases the marginal utility
of private consumption and decreases the marginal utility of public consumption, and in optimum, the
share of public consumption is reduced.  Thirdly, a larger share of private capital in production
increases the marginal product of private capital, and thus income, that increases private consumption
leading to a lower marginal utility of private consumption.  In order to reduce the marginal utility of
public consumption, the government optimally decreases the share of public investment and increases
the share of public consumption.  Finally, a smaller  intertemporal elasticity of substitution and a
larger time-preference rate both lower the marginal utility of future private consumption, and
therefore, the government optimally increases the share of public consumption in government
spending, in order to reduce the marginal utility of public consumption.       
The optimal public expenditure composition s
* in (10a) is affected by an expected economic
growth rate ￿, which is characterized by private sectors’ best response (6a).  Thus, (6a) and (10a)
together determine an optimal public consumption share and an economic growth rate in a steady-state
equilibrium.  As Loci BR and OC are downward sloping, in order to assure the existence of an interior
optimal public consumption share, we impose   (Figure 1). This requires: ˆ s <¯ s
Condition S:   ￿￿(1￿￿)
￿(1￿￿)￿(1￿￿)[1￿￿￿￿￿￿(1/￿￿1)(2￿1/￿)]






which for a small ￿ is easily met.  This condition demands the optimal share of public consumption
when economic growth is zero, to lead to a positive equilibrium economic growth rate, so that the
government responds by reducing the optimal share of public consumption, as indicated by arrows.
It is clear that the optimal share of public consumption in government expenditure, and thus
the optimal share of public investment, is determined not only by the degree of public capital
externality, but also by all the underlying policy and other structural parameters in (6a) and (10a).
Therefor, the optimal composition is different from, and is more general than, those in existing works.13
To summarize, we obtain: 
Proposition 1.  Under Conditions PB and S, there exists an interior, optimal share of public
consumption in government spending and a positive economic growth rate.  The  optimal share of
public consumption is determined by all policy and structural factors.   
V.  Optimal Composition and Economic Growth
As the composition of public spending is optimized, parameters underlying policies and
economic structure tend to affect economic growth through via public spending compositions.  This
section investigates how these factors influence the optimal public spending composition and the
resulting growth effects.  The factors can be classified into three aspects, and we start with the size
of government, followed by supply-side factors, and finally, by demand-side factors. 
1.  Size of Government
The size of government in this model is represented by the average income tax rate ￿.   Most
cross-country empirical studies find that the average growth rate of GDP per capita tends to be
negatively associated with the size of government consumption expenditure (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995).  It is interesting to analyze how the size of government affects the optimal composition
between public consumption and public capital, and the consequent effects upon economic growth.
A larger size of government may shift Locus BR upwards or downwards, depending upon the
initial government size relative to threshold    When the initial government size is ˆ ￿ ￿ (1/￿￿1)2
1￿(1/￿￿1)2.
equal to or above the threshold, a larger government size shifts Locus BR downwards to B￿R￿ (in
Figure 2), which for a given s, reduces economic growth (E1).  Moreover, the government optimally
increases the share for public consumption in response to a larger government size, and therefore,
Locus OC shifts rightward (see O￿C￿).  Economic growth is thereby reduced further (E2).  As a
corollary, under the condition that the initial government size is larger than the threshold, lowering14
government size shifts Locus BR upwards to B￿R￿, which for a given s increases economic growth
(E3), and as a smaller share of public consumption is accompanied, Locus OC shifts leftward to O￿C￿
and therefore, economic growth is increased further (E4).
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Proposition 2.   When the government optimizes its spending composition and its size is above the
threshold, lowering the government size reduces the share of public consumption, and increases
economic growth more than the case of exogenous or unresponsive public spending composition.
2. Supply-side Factors
The supply-side factors here include the productivity coefficient and the private capital share.
When production productivity is higher (a higher A), Locus BR shifts upwards to B￿R￿ in Figure 3.
Therefore, equilibrium changes from E to E1, and as a result, economic growth increases, as in
existing literature (e.g., Barro, 1990).  Moreover, as economic growth increases, the government is
induced to optimally reduce the public consumption share indirectly (along Locus OC), thereby
moving equilibrium to E2.  As a consequence, economic growth is enhanced further.  Intuitively,
higher production productivity increases marginal productivity of private capital, leading to a direct
growth effect, and resulting in higher discounted marginal utility from future consumption.  The
government therefore, optimally reduces public consumption share, in order to increase the marginal
utility of public consumption.  Public investment share is thus increased, which complements the
productivity of private capital and leads to faster capital accumulation in a steady-state equilibrium.
This allows for the economy to grow even more rapidly.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Similarly, a higher private capital share in production (a higher ￿) shifts Locus  BR  upward
to B￿R￿ in Figure 3, just as the case of higher production productivity.  Under given government
spending composition, equilibrium changes from E to E1, resulting in higher economic growth.  As11 While the direct negative growth effect in Turnovsky (1996a) and the direct positive growth effect in Piras
(2001) both come from the congestion in public consumption service, the direct negative growth effect in
Turnovsky (2000) roots in disutility from the reduction in leisure.
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the degree of government productive externality is smaller (i.e., a lower 1-￿), for a given economic
growth rate the government reduces the share of public investment in its spending, thus shifting Locus
OC rightward to O￿C￿.  Nevertheless, higher economic growth indirectly induces the government to
reduce the share of public consumption, so the net effect depends upon whether the direct or the
indirect effect dominates.  Therefore, economic growth may be enhanced or mitigated.  As our
calibration in the next section suggests, the indirect effect dominates the direct effect, and therefore,
the share of public consumption is reduced, and the economic growth rate is increased further (see E3).
Proposition 3.  Higher productivity results in a lower consumption share in public spending, thereby
leading to a stronger growth effect than the case of  exogenous or unresponsive public spending
compositions.  Higher private capital share has similar effects when the indirect effect dominates.
   
3 Demand-Side Factors
There are three demand-side parameters.  First, when a private consumption share is higher
(a higher ￿), relative to public consumption, Locus BR is not affected.  Nevertheless, Locus OC shifts
leftward to O￿C￿(see Figure 3), because a higher private consumption share reduces the marginal
utility of public consumption and increases the marginal utility of private consumption, and thus the
government optimally raises public investment and lowers public consumption, driving a leftward
shift of Locus OC and thereby relocating equilibrium from E to E4.  As a result, optimal public
consumption share decreases and economic growth increases.  This indirect positive growth effect
differs from those in conventional wisdom.  For example, a higher private consumption share does
not have any direct or indirect growth effect in Barro (1990), whereas it causes a direct negative
growth effect in Turnovsky (1996, 2000), and a direct, but not an indirect, positive growth effect in
Piras (2001).
11  These differences lie in the situation that the government in our model optimally16
increases the share of public investment in reaction to a higher share of private consumption, which
complements private capital formation and thereby enhances economic growth.
Finally, higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (a lower ￿) and lower
time-preference rates (a lower ￿) both increase the growth rate of consumption, shifting Locus BR




 and B￿R￿, respectively in Figure 4).  For given government spending
composition, equilibrium changes to E1 and E2, respectively, and economic growth is higher.
Moreover, both these changes raise the marginal utility of future consumption, and in optimum, the
government reduces public consumption shares shifting Locus OC leftward toward O￿C￿.  It follows
that equilibrium moves to E3 and E4, respectively, thereby increasing economic growth.   Therefore,
indirectly through increasing optimal public investment shares by the government, resulting in larger
private capital formation, a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution in our model raises
economic growth higher than that obtained in existing studies with only a direct effect (e.g., Barro,
1990), and a lower time-preference rate strengthens economic growth than the proposed growth from
existing literature (e.g., Palivos and Yip, 1995).
Proposition 4.  Higher private consumption share and intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and
a lower time-preference rate all increase optimal public investment shares in government expenditure,
resulting in a stronger positive growth effect, as compared with public spending compositions which
are exogenous or unresponsive to these factors.
VI.  Some Numerical Results
Further insights into the growth effects of policy and structural parameters through
adjustments in public expenditure compositions can be obtained by carrying out numerical analysis
of the model.  We begin by characterizing a benchmark economy, by calibrating the model using the12 For economic growth in Taiwan between the 1950s and the early 1990s, see Tallman and Wang (1994). 
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following parameter values representative of the Taiwan economy:
12
￿=0.04, ￿=2.5, ￿=0.15, ￿=0.92, ￿=0.305983, ￿=0.80227.
We should note that calibration into other economies, e.g., the U.S., will generate similar
results. While parameter value for the time preference rate, ￿, is taken from Turnovsky (2000), the
coefficient for risk aversion, ￿, is chosen as 2.5 so that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/￿)
is smaller than one (e.g., Jones, et al., 1993).  We choose a time-preference rate higher than 2% used
for the U.S., because the calibrated Taiwan economy has a higher real economic growth rate per
capita, and a higher time-preference rate assures the bounded lifetime utility.  As we calibrate the
model to the Taiwan economy whose s is 0.8, the consistency in equation (10a) requires ￿>s, and
therefore the parameter for the share for public capital, 1-￿, must be less than 0.2.  We choose 1-￿=
8%, which lies between the range for the documentation of high externality (e.g., Aschauer, 1989) and
low externality  (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) of public capital.  With the chosen ￿=0.92, the
threshold of tax rates for the maximal economic growth rate is    We use ˆ ￿ ￿ (1/￿￿1)2
1￿(1/￿￿1)2 ￿0.751%.
average tax burden 15% in Taiwan to measure the flat tax rate and thus, the size of government.
Finally, based on these parameter values, we calibrate both the values for productivity coefficient, A,
and for the share of public expenditure contributed to household’s utility, 1-￿, so that the model
economy is consistent with both the real per capita GDP growth rate ￿=5.8% and the share of public
capital in government expenditure 1-s=20% in Taiwan in 1952-1999 (CEPD, 2001).  Using economic
system (6a) and (10a), we thus obtain ￿=0.30598 and ￿=0.80229. These parameters lead to the
following steady-state equilibrium values:  s=80% and ￿=5.8%.  See Row 1 in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here]
Rows 2-7  in Table 1 describe various shocks from the benchmark.  Row 2 reports the effects
of reducing the size of government.  Notice that the calibrated ￿=15% is larger than the threshold for
the maximal economic growth rate,    Therefore, as the size of government is reduced by ˆ ￿ ￿0.751%.18
1 percentage point to 14%, under exogenous public spending composition economic growth is
increased mildly by d￿= 0.083 percentage points to ￿=5.883%.  This yields a weak, negative
association between the size of government and the economic growth rate.  As the government
optimizes its spending composition, public consumption spending share is lowered to s1=60.48% and
public investment share is increased to 39.52%.  This leads to faster capital accumulation, and hence,
economic growth is raised further by ￿1-￿=0.451 percentage points to ￿1=6.334%.  Consequently,
the negative relationship between the size of government and economic growth is more apparent.
Rows 3-4 are shocks to the supply side.  Under exogenous or unresponsive public spending
composition, a neutral productivity increase (a higher A) from 0.305983 to 0.32 raises the economic
growth rate to 6.169%, whereas an increase in private capital share (a higher ￿) from 0.92 to 0.93
accompanies a larger economic growth rate (6.486%).  Under optimal government spending
composition, a higher productivity and a larger capital share in production, reduce optimal public
consumption share from 80% to s1=60.41% and s1=63.82%, respectively, and as a result, the
economic growth rate increases further by 0.485 percentage points to 6.664% for the larger A, and by
0.354 percentage points to 6.514% for the larger ￿. 
Finally, Rows 5-7 are changes in the demand side.  While a higher private consumption share
in household’s utility (￿) is increased from 0.80227 to 0.82, it does not change the equilibrium
economic growth in the case of exogenous public spending composition (Row 5).  Under optimal
public spending composition, however, it reduces optimal public consumption shares contributing to
higher  public capital services.  As a consequence, the economic growth rate is increased by ￿1-
￿=0.488 percentage points to 6.288%.  Finally, for an increase in the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution from 1/2.5 to 1/2.4 (i.e., a higher 1/￿) and a reduction in the time-preference rate (￿) from
0.04 to 0.039, the economic growth rate is increased mildly by d￿=0.242 and d￿=0.04 percentage
points, respectively, when public spending composition is exogenous  (Rows 6 and 7).  When public
spending composition is optimized, both changes lead to higher optimal public investment shares.19
The economic growth rate is raised by 0.477 percentage points to 6.519% for the smaller ￿, and by
0.451 percentage points to 6.291% for the smaller ￿. 
In summary, when the public spending composition between consumption and investment is
optimized, our numerical results indicate sizable growth effects for shocks to policies and structural
parameters.  In particular, except for a change in ￿, the induced, indirect growth effect through public
spending composition (Column ￿1-￿ in Table 1) is larger than the conventional direct growth effect
(Column d￿).    These quantitative results lend supports to the importance of taking public spending
composition into consideration when investigating the engines of economic growth.    
VII.  Concluding Remarks
This paper extends existing endogenous growth models into incorporating both public
consumption and public investment, to optimize public spending compositions and investigates their
relationships with economic growth.  It builds a simple, one-sector growth model to study these issues.
It derives a unique, interior optimal public investment share of total government budget, and thus a
unique interior, optimal public consumption share, which is determined by policy and structural
parameters.  
This paper also finds that economic factors which affect economic growth in conventional
wisdom, now yield stronger growth effects, from government’s optimal response through its spending
share adjustments between investment and consumption.  These effects emerge because these
economic factors change the marginal utility of private consumption, relative to the marginal utility
from public consumption, and therefore, induce the government to redistribute its budget between
investment and consumption spending.  Our numerical results indicate large growth effects through
this mechanism, and in most cases the indirect growth effect through public spending composition is
larger than the direct growth effect.
Finally, many existing cross-sectional empirical growth studies have investigated the growth20
effects of productive and public consumption spending.  These studies normally use the ratios of
public consumption spending to gross domestic products (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Ch. 12),
or to total government expenditure (e.g., Devarajan, et al, 1996), as a regressor against the long-run
growth rate of real per capita GDP, and estimate and test the effects of public spending upon long-
term economic growth.  Moreover, observations indicate that East Asian countries have had  higher
fractions of public investment in government spending and higher economic growth rates than other
area’s countries, among other differences.  To the extent that a government optimizes its spending
shares, the shares are determined by underlying economic structure.  Our results suggest that high
public investment shares in East Asian countries come from their governments’ adjustment toward
fundamental economic structures.  Therefore, a high public investment share, and thus a low public
consumption share, itself may not be the main underlying reason for explaining cross-country  growth
differentials.  They are the result of the government’s optimal choices. 
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Table 1.  Some Simulation Results
%
￿ d￿ s1 ￿1 ￿1 - ￿
 benchmark 5.8 0 80 5.8 0
 ￿ =0.14 5.88316 0.08316 60.48 6.33397 0.45081
 A =0.32 6.169 0.369 60.41 6.66445 0.48545
 ￿ =0.93 6.15657 0.35657 63.82 6.51409 0.35392
 ￿ =0.82 5.8 0 58.32 6.28792 0.48792
 ￿ =2.4 6.04167 0.24167 60.08 6.51915 0.47748
 ￿ = 0.039 5.84 0.04 60.49 6.29133 0.45133
Note: Parameter values for the benchmark case are:  ￿ =0.15, A=0.305983,  ￿ =0.92,  ￿ =0.80227, 
￿ =2.5 and  ￿= 0.04.  Notation ￿ indicates the real economic growth rate per capita and d￿
its changes when s is fixed at 80%, whereas ￿1 denotes the real economic growth rate per
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[(￿￿￿￿)￿(1/￿￿1)(2￿1/￿)￿￿￿]2 < 0, (B1)
Appendix:    (Not To Be Published)
This appendix derives some comparative-static results.
A Derivation of the comparative-static results in equation (6b).  
Differentiation of (6a) with respect to ￿, s,￿, A, ￿, ￿ and ￿ leads to
 
B. Derivation of the comparative-static results in equation (10b).  
























(￿￿￿￿￿￿)2 ￿ ￿￿￿(￿￿(1/￿￿1)(2￿1/￿)￿ ￿)























< 0, (B5)N u m b e r    A u t h o r ( s )             T i t l e                                                 D a t e  
03-A001  Chung-Ming  Kuan     A  New  Test  of  the  martingale  Difference  Hypothesis          11/03 
         W e i - M i n g   L e e  
          
03-A002  Chung-Ming  Kuan,    A  Component-Driven  Model for Regime Switching and Its            11/03 
       Yu-Lieh  Huang       Empirical 
        R u e y   S .   T s a y  
 
03-A003  Yi-Ting  Chen         A  Generalized  Jarque-Bera Test of Concitiional  Normality      11/03 
         Chung-Ming  Kuan 
  
03-A004  Kamhon  Kan,         The  Dynamics  and  Volatility  of  commercial  and  Residential     11/03 
         Sunny  Kai-Sun  Kwong  Property Prices : Theory and Evidence 
         C h a r l e s   K a - Y u i   L e u n g  
 
03-A005  Kamhon  Kan          Parenting  Practices  and  Children's  Education  Outcome         11/03 
         W e i - D e r   T s a i  
  
03-A006  Been-Lon  Chen        Factor  Taxation  and  Labor  Supply  In  A  Dynamic              12/03 
                              O n e - S e c t o r   G r o w t h   M o d e l  
 
03-A007  Been-Lon  Chen        Economic  Growth  With  Optimal  Public  Spending             12/03 
Compositional 
            
 
 